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PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: 
ITS PAST AND FUTURE* 
CHARLES R.HALPERN 
FIVE years ago, the term public interest law' had not been coined. 
Today a public interest bar exists and its role within the legal 
profession is significant enough to warrant an audit. 
Public interest law is the newest addition to those fields of law 
in which legal services are provided tD those who are disadvan• 
taged or whose interests are so diffuse that they are outside the 
normal marketplace for legal services. These areas of law have in 
common a need for some kind of subsidy - whether from the gov-
emmen~ private philanthropy, or the legal profession itself~ 
Civil rights law, civil liberties law, and poverty law are now 
reasonably well understood areas of practice. The constituencies 
they represent have grown accustomed to seeking redress through 
the courts and have even developed a rather sophisticated unde~ 
standing of the potential and the limitations of the judicial process. 
The public interest lawyers, on the other hand, define their role 
more broadly than the poverty lawyers. First, the public interest 
lawyers believe that the poor are not the only people excluded from 
the decision•making process on issues of vital importance to. them. 
All people concerned with environmental degradation, with product 
safety, with consumer protection, whatever their class, are ef-
fectively excluded from key decisions. affecting those interests. 
Second, the public interest lawyers are beginning to move in an 
area that ha~ only been tangentially touched by the ·poverty law-
yers - that domain where corporate power shapes governmental 
power, where decisions affecting large numbers of citizens are 
often quietly made. The public interest .lawyers began to bring 
citizen interests before agencies that had previously dealt only 
•The Editor would like to acknowledge the initiative taken by David 
Scicluna, LL.D. who was instrumental in acquiring this article for publi· 
cation. 
We woald also like to thank JUD/CA TURE, by whose courtesy this art• 
icle is being reprinted here. 
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with the industries they regulated. For example: 
•9lould the license of a racist television station in Mississippi 
be renewed? While this decision vitally affects the interests of 
many black Mississippians, traditionally it would have been made 
by the station and the Federal Communications Commission with· 
out participation of interested listeners. 1 
•Should ttUck owners be warned about dangerous wheels in-
stalled on General Motors pick·up trucks? This question, which 
potentially affects all highway users, . would have been worked out 
between GM and the National Highway Safety Bureau without citi-
zen rep re sen cation. 2 
•91.ould ineffective drugs be removed from the market and after 
what procedures? This issue historically had been negotiated be-
tween the Federal Food and Drug Administration and the drug in-
dustry, but what of the millions of citizens who may buy useless 
drugs? 3 
HISTORY 
Because many public interest lawyers came out of government 
and large corporate law firms, they knew first hand that many 
courts and adminisuative agencies resolved important issues of 
public policy without benefit of adversary presentations. They 
knew how meticulously the corporate lawyer prepares a case and 
how he devotes limitless leg.il resources to highly polished ad· 
vocacy. They knew how expert wimesses are recruited, screened, 
prepared, and presented for maximu~ impact. And they knew the 
kinds of political pressures which can be marshalled .to comple· 
ment legal arguments. As believers in the adversary process, pub-
lic interest lawyers thought it important to develop legal counter-
weights to the corporate bar. Some public interest lawyers estab· 
lished tax-exempt institutes like the Center for Law and Social 
Policy (CLASP), and. sought foundation support for their activity. 
Others organized conventionally structured parmerships to re-
present under-represented grc;>ups; suspicious of the lon~tenn 
reliability of foundations, they sought to serve citizen groups, in· 
eluding conservation and consumer groups, . who could pay modest 
fees. 
1 Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 465 
F. 2d 519 (D.C. Ci.t. 1972). . 
2 NADER v. Volpe, 320F. Supp. 266 (D.C.D.C. 1970). 
1 American Public Health Association v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311 
(D.C.D.C. 1972) • . 
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The first years were lean for lawyers in both types of public 
interest firm. Fee-paying clients were slow coming and slow pay-
ing. The foundations were skeptical about underwriting unconven-
tional litigation. For its first six months, for example, CLASP was 
housed, rent-free, in the row•house of one of its four attorneys; the 
Xerox machine sat on his kitchen table. At several points during 
this period, it seemed that the venture would have to be abandoned 
and the four lawyers return to traditional practice. 
Slowly, however, the elements of a successful project began to 
come together. With the support of Arthur Goldberg, then recently 
returned to private life, CLASP was able to recruit highly respec-
ted and concerned austees. Some of the smaller and more ven rure-
some foundations gave -start-up grants. 'A clinical training program 
was begun in cooperation with Stanford, UCLA, Michigan, Pennsyl· 
vania, and Yale law schools. In the spring of 1970, major litigation 
successes in the Alaska pipeline case and the DDT litigation 
helped establish the credibility and impact of the program. A year 
aftet it began operation, CLASP received a major grant from the 
Ford Foundation. 
The development of the public interest law movement owes much 
to the Ford Foundation and a few other foundations. In addition to 
the Center for Law and Social Policy, the Natural Resources De .. 
fense Council, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Citizens 
Communication Center, Public Advocates, the Center for Law in 
the Public Interest, and ·the Institute for Public Interest Represen .. 
ration, have relied heavily on these foundations for their financial 
support. 
Each of these law groups developed a different focus and struc-
ture. Some focused on particular subjects, like the Gtizens Com .. 
munication Center on the F:c~c.,. and the Natural Resources 
Defense Council on environmental issues. Some emphasized clini• 
cal education and law school ties, (Institute for Public Interest 
Representation an.d CLASP). Others focused on local _issues (Stern 
Community Law Firm) or state matters (Center for Law in the Pub-
lic Interest). Some built memberships and filed suits in their · own 
name (Environmental Defense Fund) while others were aligned with 
existing membership organizations (Sierra Oub Legal Defense 
Fund and Consumers Union Law Firm). 
This brief description may give the impression of a massive 
build .. up of powerful citizen advocacy entities - which would be a 
gross exaggeration. The tangle of alphabetically-abbreviated in-
stitutions resemble the New Deal agencies only in their confusing 
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interrelationships and bewildering acronyms, not in . their size, 
scope, or power. In fact, the public interest bar has never ex• 
ceeded more than a few dozen lawyers. The most impressive 
names - Centers, Funds, Coun.cils, ·and Ins cl.cutes - were often 
facades behind which two or three relatively inexperienced lawyers 
stood. 
This limited fire power notwithstanding, the programs challenged 
were often massive: highway, pipeline, and dam construction; im-
port quotas on basic commodities such as steel and oil; mergers of 
large banks. In addition, public interest lawyers, trying to maxi· 
mize the impact of their sparse resources, sought cases involving 
preceden c-setcing issues. For example, at the outset, when stand· 
ing doctrines served to bar the citizen litigant from his day in 
court, each successful case established an important precedent. 
Environmental cases had an important impact on the interpretation 
of the newly-passed Nacional Environmental Policy Act and other 
environmental le gislacion. 
There were easy victories in the early years. Government agen· 
des and the industries they regulated, unaccustomed to having 
their actions challenged, did not take the trouble to make a record 
that would withstand judicial review. The highway builders, the 
nuclear power promoters, the offshore oil explorers, and the auto 
industry are now beginning to adapt to a new kind of legal system 
- one in which their arguments do not always go unopposed. Two 
examples will suggest some of the impact and problems of the pub· 
lie interest bar: 
The Alaska Pipeline. 4 In April 1970, environmental groups ob• 
rained a preliminary injunction against the issuance of permits by 
the Department of the Interior for construction of a trans-Alaska 
pipeline. Prior to this suit, the D ep aronen t of the Interior had 
barely gone through the motions of complying with the newly· 
passed National Environmental Policy Act, and had ignored the 
plain language of the Mineral Leasing Act which limited the width 
of pipeline rights·of·way over public lands. 
The Department was accustomed to challenge from the oil in· 
duscry and other industries with a financial interest in exploiting 
public lands and other natural resources. However, it was unac• 
customed ro opposition from environmentalists and interested citi· 
zen groups. The grant of a preliminary injunction by the district 
court threw it back into a re-evaluation of the pipeline's environ· 
4 Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C.Cir. 1974). 
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mental consequences that lasted almost two years. 
After the Department of the Interior had satisfied itself that the 
pipeline plan was environmentally acceptable, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit still held that the is-
suance of the pipeline permit violated the Mineral Leasing Act. 
Throughout this Ii tigation, environmental protection groups suc-
cessfully insisted on close scrutiny of the environmental con.; 
sequences of the pipeline and demanded that the Deparonent ad-
here to Congressional mandates. 
Ultimately the decision on whether to build the pipeline was 
remanded to Congress where a tie vote in the Senate was broken 
by Vice President Agnew•s vote favoring construction. Regrettably, 
while the oil companies lobbied heavily for the bill, the environ-
mentalists were handcuffed by the Internal Revenue Service prohi-
bition on lobbying by tax-exempt organizations. 
The DDT Litigation. 5 In 1969, public interest lawyers, marshal· 
ling the scientific evidence establishing the hazards of DDT, filed 
a petition in the Deparanent of Agriculrure to institute cancella-
tion proceedings for DDT. At that time, the Deparanent did not 
even have a procedure for entertaining citizen petitions, and this 
one was simply left on the desk of the Secretary's secretary. The 
Secretary assured the petitioning environmentalists that he had the 
matter under scrutiny and that their input was welcome but un-
necessary. 
Reviewing this decision, the court of appeals, in a series of 
opinions, held that the environmentalists had standing to petition 
the Deparanent of Agriculture and then seek judicial review of the 
rejection of their petition; and that the evidence presented was 
sufficient, as a matter of law, to require the Department to in· 
stitute the administrative procedure which could lead to cancella· 
tion. Thereafter, during the course of a seven-month administrative 
hearing, the Environmental Protection Agency (to which the pesci· 
cide regulation responsibility had been shifted from Agriculture) 
concluded that DDT registrations should be cancelled. In Decem· 
her 1973, four years after the initial petition had been filed by 
environmentalists, the court of appeals sustained this decision. 
VICTORIES OUT OF CoURT 
In both cases cited above, litigation was successful. But in the 
5 Environmental Defense Fund, v. Hardin, 428 F. 2d 1093 (D.C.Cir. 1970): 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelsbaus, 439 F .2d 534 (D.C.Cir. 
1971). 
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pipeline case the judicial victory was overturned, and in the DDT 
matter the cost of victory was extremely high in terms of profes-
sional resources. Because li cigation is often time-consuming and 
costly, public interest 1 awyers have tried to use nonlicigati ve 
advocacy methods to further the policy objectives of their clients. 
For instance: 
•CLASP has tried to open to citizen participation the process 
by which the State Department formulates positions on interna· 
tional matters which have domestic impact. In temational environ• 
mental agreementst for example, affect the quality of our beaches 
and the extent of our deep water oil exploration; tariff barriers 
increase che prices that American consumers pay for imported 
produces. State Deparonenc officials formulate positions on such 
issues in close consultation with representatives of interested 
industries, but citizens rarely have an opportunity to p a.rcicipace. 
CLASP• s Internacional Project has $UCceeded in educating some 
State Department officials and others in the incernacional law com-
munity to the legitimacy of citizen involvement in such decisions. 
The effectiveness of Internacional Project participation in infom1al 
State Department discussions is reinforced by occasional resort to 
the courts. 
•The Environmental Protection Agency has broad discretion, 
under recent legislative guidelines, in formulating clean air stand• 
ards for different parts of the country. The Natural Resources 
Defense Council has established a project to monicor the EPA 
discharge of these statutory responsibilities and to participate in 
the formulation of standards. NRDC lawyers have developed ex· 
percise in chis matter, contacts with technical consultants> and 
relationships with personnel within EPA ln order to help assert 
the environmentalists' interest in strict enforcement of the legis· 
lacion . . 
•Another important technique of public interest law is in-depth 
investigation of an agency's performance and publication of com· 
prehensive reports on its successes and failures. Ralph Nader's 
pioneering report on the Federal Trade Commission, for example, 
revealed cronyism, lethargy, and a total failure by the agency to 
serve the public interest. The report triggered an ABA invesciga• 
tion and led to Che revitalization of the ~gency under the leader· 
ship of Oiairman Miles Kirkpatrick. 
•Public interest lawyers have created new forums for public 
policy decision and debate. The P roject on Corporate Responsi· 
bilicy was established to develop corporate law doctrine in 1nno-
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vative ways and to seek new ways to attack socially irresponsible 
corporate policies. The annual ritual of a corporate shareholder's 
meeting, through the efforts of the Project, became a significant 
forum for the debate of corporate social responsibility. The Pro· 
ject spotlighted General Motors' policies which adversely affected 
minority groups, the environment and consumers. It also helped 
awaken such inscirucional investors as universities, foundations, 
and church groups to their social responsibilities as investors, 
and led directly to the reformulation of invesonent policies in 
many such inscirutions. 
APPRAISAL 
An appraisal of the first five years of public interest advocacy 
reveals mixed results. 
First, the public interest lawyers have won important Ii tigation 
victories. Some, like the DDT litigation, have had important im· 
pact on policy; others, like the Alaska pipeline litigation, have . 
proven transHory. 
But winning lawsuits, as any lawyer knows, does not mean that 
the client's objectives are attained. Corporations can al ways call 
on more lawyers, more scientists, and more engineers than can 
citizen groups. They can often end-run the legal process by going 
to Congress and re-writing the rules. They can manipulate markets 
to generate scarcity and manipulate the media co create crises. 
These techniques, which are beyond the reach of the public inter-
est lawyer or his clients, will always limit the value of litigation 
as a citizen's weapon. 
Second, the public interest lawyers have begun to expand con· 
sciousness within the bar. The American Bar Association - Pre-
sident Chesterfield Smith has strongly endorsed public interest 
law and has suggested that lawyers tax themselves to support pub-
lic interest efforts. 
On the other hand, the influential Administrative Conference of 
the United States, a public body, overwhelmingly represents th.e 
corporate bar, government attorneys, and academics. There are 
only two public interest lawyers among its membership of 91; a 
recent suggesµon that the membership of the conference should 
include additional public interest lawyers was rejected. 
Third, during the past five years, public int~rest lawyers have 
helped create a new aanosphere of receptivity t~ citizen advocacy 
in many administrative agencies. The Environmental Protection 
Agency (which has the advantages of enjoying a fresh mandate and 
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vigorous lead~rship) is an encouraging example of an agency 
where dedicated service to the public interest has been the rule,-
not the exception. 
However, success has been limited. The domination of the ad-
ministrative agencies by the industries they regulate has scarcely 
been affected. Private law firms successfully influence admin-
istrative agency decisions because they have groups of specialists 
who monitor the decisions of the agency with continual representa-
tion of their clients• viewpoints. In contrast, much public interest 
practice has been more ad hoc than systemati~, and continuity of 
involvement has usually been impossible. Like their clients, pub-
lic interest lawyers frequently respond to crises rather than devel· . 
op systematic programs. 
A core group of lawyers systematically dealing with similar 
problems in the same agency would appear to be a minimum re-
quirement for effective citizen representation. This does not mean 
that the legions of lawyers who represent corporate interests must 
be duplicated on the public interest side; but there must be suf-
ficient resources to maintain an ongoing presence in the various 
agencies. Moreover, especially in agencies dealing with complex 
technological problems, public interest 1 awyers need access to 
experts. Corporate lawyers have the benefit of the expertise lodged 
in their corporate clients; and they have funds to retain 'indepen• 
dent' experts to buttress their clients' opinions. In contrast, pub-
lic interest lawyers are usually compelled to seek donated ser-
vices from those experts who are neither paid consultants to cor-
porations nor people hoping to find consultant contracts. 
Fourth, the citizen groups represented by public interest law-
yers have b·een educated by their participation in litigation. They 
have learned that they must develop more coherent strategies and 
not dissipate their energies by stopping a highway here or a power 
line crossing there. They have been educated to the power of liti-
gation as a tool, and some groups, such as the Na rural Wildlife 
Federation, have been led to retain a staff of in-house attorneys. 
Nevertheless, -few citizen groups have the funds, expertise or 
stability to effectively develop coherent strategies. The environ-
mentalists are relatively fortunate in this regard. Where interests 
are more diffuse and less urgently felt, or where there are in-
adequate financial resources, effective citizen organization is 
much more difficult. What group will develop a strategy to assure 
effective drug regulation or to promote an adequate public housing 
subsidy? 
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TAX EXEMPTION 
The efficacy of public interest practice has been limited by the 
fact that many public interest lawyers are associated with tax 
exempt programs which prohibit them from representation before 
legislative bodies. Many public interest cases, like the Alaska 
pipeline case, can be readily recast and transferred by interested 
corporations from administrative agencies into legislative forums. 
The tax exempt status of many public interest law programs is a 
continuing source of concern. In the fall of 1970, the Internal Re-
venue Service unexpectedly issued a ruling effectively suspending 
the tax exemption of public interest law groups. There was much 
public debate over this matter, and expressions of congressional 
concern from all points on the political spectrum, including then· 
Congressman Gerald Ford. After six weeks of debate, the IRS 
withdrew its ruling and acknowledged that public interest law was 
properly viewed as a tax exempt activity. 
That, however, did not signal the end of IRS interference. The 
Center on Corporate Responsibility, an offshoot of the Project on 
C.Orporate Responsibility, was virtually destroyed by the IRS' 
failure to act on their tax exemption application. By the time the 
district court for the District of Columbia ordered the IRS to grant 
an exemption, the Center was moribund. 
IRS interference with public interest practice is also reflected 
in its failure to delineate when a public interest law firm can 
accept a fee. Uncertainty regarding this matter is a serious handi· 
cap to some public interest firms, which regard fee awards as an 
important source of income. In some cases courts have ordered 
large fee payments to public interest lawyers. But the IRS position 
has not yet allowed payment of fees to tax-exempt public interest 
law firms. 
THE FUTURE 
We are entering a new phase in the evolution of a public interest 
bar. The foundations which have played a major role in its early 
development will be reassessing their commitments. The ABA, 
through its new Special Committee on Public Interest Practice, 
will be evaluating the bar's responsibility for maintaining an ad· 
versary process in judicial and administrative proceedings. 
Many public interest institutions were candidly begun as experi-
ments, without any expectation of pennanence. They must now 
confront difficult decisions about their futures. In the past year, 
several lawyers have left public interest practice and returned to 
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the security afforded by conventional careers. 
During the first phase, the public interest lawyers were testing 
a hypothesis - that public interest representation could improve 
the quality of decision-making on important issues of public 
policy. The experiment was not carried out under ideal conditions. 
There were too few public interest lawyers; their services were 
often offered to groups ill-prepared to take advantage of them; 
they were underfinanced, had insufficient technical advice, and 
were unable to carry their case to the legislarures. Nonetheless, 
the results of the experiment to date are positive and indicate an 
important future role for the public interest bar. 
As it enters its second phase, this fledgling legal movement 
must institutionalize past gains, expand opportunities for citizen 
involvement and ab an don its commirmen t to the adversary process. 
Abandonment of public interest practice would deprive government 
agencies of important input which has increased their awareness 
of public attitudes and raised the quality of their output. It would 
deprive citizens of an important tool for affecting government and 
corporate decisions that strongly influence their lives. It would 
force the legal profession to rum its back on even the pretense 
that an adversary process is basic to justice and that the ability 
to pay legal fees is not the key to the courthouse door. 
FINANCES 
Continuing subsidy of public interest practice will be neces-
sary, and new sources of funds must be located. Except in rare 
cases, citizen groups will not be able to draw on their own re-
sources to support public interest litigation. For example, the 
later phases of the Alaska pipeline litigation involved more than 
4,000 hours of lawyer time. Even environmental groups represent· 
ing a relatively ~~11-heeled constituency can ill afford the cost of 
~ch litigation. The private firms engaged in public interest prac· 
tice have not identified a sufficient client pool to support a sub-
stantial number of lawyers doing public interest work and relying 
on fees. 
The San Diego conference recently sponsored by the Ford Foun· 
dation focused on the financial future of the public interest bar. 
At that meeting ABA President Oiesterfield Smith, and other bar 
leaders affirmed the importance of the public inter.est lawyers' 
contributions and committed themselves to future efforts to assure 
the development of public interest practice. The conference urged 
the establishment of a Council for the Advancement of Public 
53 
terest Law to explore alternative funding mechanisms and devel· 
, longterm financial resources. 
One important vehicle to be considered by the Council is a Fund 
r Public Interest Law, endowed primarily by contributions from 
iaritable foundations and the bar. Rather than a few foundations 
aking grants to several public interest fi~ms for a year or two at 
time, the · fund could be established under the direction of lea· 
!rs of the public interest bar and other elements of the legal 
·ofession. 
In the past, foundation grants have gone to entities with tax 
~empt status. The fund would explore a more flexible approach, 
ich as funding particular projects by individual lawyers or or-
mizations, or making loans available to carry the substantial 
·etrial costs of major litigation where there was significant pro· 
ise of an ultimate benefit. 
Any fund proposal will face substantial problems •. How should 
::arce resources be allocated among competing claimants? Should 
o grams serving the poor on civil matters, indigent criminal de· 
nee work and. programs serving conservationist interests have 
qual priority? Stould service or test litigation be favored? Re-
:>lution of such issues would be particularly important because 
ie fund would become the dominant source of finances in the 
.iblic interest law area. It is important, however, that the fund not 
ecome the exclusive funding source. Reliance on a single source, 
o matter how well-intentioned its directors might be, would under· 
llt the diversity of representation which public interest law is 
esigned to assure. 
In addition to a national fund supp~rted by the organized bar, 
tdividual attorneys practicing in a very lucrative profession might 
e solicited, although the past history of voluntary contributions 
y the profession is discouraging. Better still, in jurisdictions 
'kc the District of Columbia, in which there is a unified bar with 
g,OOO members, dues might be raised co support a local fund for 
ublic interest practice. The bars of Beverly Hills, Boston, and 
'hiladelphia have already established public interest law firms 
upported by members' dues. 
•Ro BONO PROGRAMS 
In recent years, some corporate law firms have developed pro 
ono programs. A few years ago it appeared that these programs 
light provide a significant supplement to the efforts of full·time 
overty lawyers and public interest lawyers. Skeptics, however, 
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maintained that these programs were largely a public relations de-
vice at a time when it was difficult to recruit young attomeys for 
· conventional commercial practice. The conflict-of-interest problem 
inherent in the corporate lawyers' situation when he represented a 
citizens group against corporate interests was al so thought to 
pose a significant barrier. 
It now appears that the skeptics may have been right. The con• 
cept of the pro bono commitment of large firms has not been widely 
accepted. Indeed, the steam has run out of many of the pro bono 
programs established in the past few years, as the partners who 
set up their pro grams return to their regular corporate clients. With 
the job market tightening for young lawyers, law school graduates 
are more Willing to accept full·time corporate practice as the least 
unpalatable career alternative, · and enthusiasm for pro bono pro-
grams has waned. 
AWARDING FEES 
An important future source of funds for public interest practice 
could be the award of the attorneys' fees to successful public 
interest l!tigants. The concept of awarding attorneys' fees in order 
to encourage public interest litigation which helps to enforce 
legislative policies has received explicit Congressional recogni-
tion. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides for the 
award of fees to successful plaintiffs in employment discrimina-
tion cases. Proposed amendments to the Freedom of Information 
Act now pending in Congress would authorize the award of attor· 
neys' fees to plaintiffs who were forced to undertake the expense 
of going to ·court in order to obtain information from the govemmenc 
to which they are entitled. Legislation has been proposed to alter 
the a.irrent statute, [28 U.S.C. section 241], which has been inter-
preted as barring fee awards against the Federal government. With 
few exceptions, a plaintiff who successfully sues the Federal 
government or an offi.cer of the government has not been permitted 
co recover attorneys fees. 
Even without legislative action, the courts have begun to award 
attorneys fees to successful public interest litigants. In a Cali-
fornia lawsuit brought on behalf of poor people displaced by urban 
renewal, the court awarded a reasonable fee co Public Advocates, 
the public interest law firm reJ:>resenting the plaintiffs. 6 In the 
6 Hearings before the Subcom. On Employment, Manpower, and Poverty of 
the Com. on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Sen., 9lst ~ong. 2d sess., 
'Tax Exemptions for Charitable Organizations Affecting Poverty Pro-
grams.' 
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Uaska pipeline case the Court of Appeals for the District of 
:Olumbia Circuit awarded a fee to the lawyers representing the en-
ironmental challengers, to be paid by the oil companies.' In a 
ecent decision, the Supreme Court affirmed that such fee awards 
ue within the equitable power of the courts. 
The administrative agencies have been much less willing to 
Lward attorneys' fees to public interest litigants. The Federal 
:Ommunications Commission has even prohibited a licensee from 
>aying a citizen group's attorneys' fees as an element in the set-
:lement of a licence renewal challenge. 8 The FCC has recently 
reaffinned its opposition to attorney fee awards in administra~ 
tive proceedings, claiming it lacked statutory authority to re• 
quire the award of such fee, and that such an award would be 
against public policy. 9 
While the agencies complain of the courts' failure to give suit-
able deference to their decisions, they still refuse to build an ad· 
versary process into their proceedings to give their rulings .credi· 
bility. Hopefully, the courts will begin to recognize the principle 
that an agency decision made without full and robust adversary 
proceedings is entitled to less weight than a decision reached 
after an adversary hearing. 
The award of attorneys' fees is no panacea and it would be a 
mistake to rely on its evolution alone for the continued susten· 
ance of the public interest bar. A fian depending wholly on fees 
would necessarily incline toward more conventional cases where 
the likelihood of a fee was greater and a lengthy and expensive 
proceeding less likely. Furthermore, past experience suggests that 
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fee awards to public interest lawyers are likely to be inadequate. 
The award of more adequate fees could create new opporrunities 
for a variety of mixed law practices. For example, a firm dedicated 
to public interest practice might spend some part of its time on 
conventional legal work, other time on cases where court-awarded 
attorneys' fees were anticipated, and some part of its time of 
foundation-subsidized public interest work. Regrettably Internal 
Revenue Service, in its 1970 ruling, refused to permit tax exempt 
7 Tenants and owners in OP position to Redevelopment, et al. v. U.S. 
Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, et al., Civ. No. C-69 324 SAW, 
dee. Jan. 20, 1974 (N.D.Calif.). 
8 Wilderness Society v. M0 rton 495F.2d1026 (D.C.Cir.1974) (cert.pen• 
ding). 
9 WSMT, Inc., 74·85 (released Feb. 12, 1974). 
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public interest firms to accept fees except in accordance with IRS 
rules - rules the IRS has still failed to promulgate. Hence, the 
opportunities for mixed practice have been severely curtailed. 
The public interest lawyers are off to a promising start, but it is 
only a start. They have shown that broader public involvement can 
shake the coiporate hammerlock on policy decisions, but they have 
done little more than define the problems with greater clarity and 
delineate some paths which should be explored in the future • .The 
challenge raised by the public interest bar is simply this: will the 
bench and bar structure their roles, responsibilities, and institu- · 
cions to permit the development of public interest representation 
on a scale proportionate to the bar which represents corporate 
interest? 
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